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Abstract
This thesis addresses Six Sigma process improvements and the supplier management
issues resulting from the shift to external suppliers in the aftermath of a fire.
Originally, this thesis was to address a lean implementation in Raytheon's substrate
fabrication area. It was intended to build on work done by Satish Krishnan, which
focused on a lean implementation in a related area. However, a fire in Raytheon's El
Segundo substrate area forced Raytheon to outsource substrate production and brought to
the forefront a different set of challenging issues.
The fire shut down production for 21 days, creating pressure to capture lost ground once
operations resumed. The increased demand and burden on resources during the recovery
uncovered inefficiencies in key processes. One of the areas that increased in importance
following the fire was magnet assembly. The first half of this thesis (Chapter 3 through
Chapter 6) applies Raytheon's Six Sigma framework to the magnet assembly process in
an effort to reduce non-value added work and increase standardization and control.
Six Sigma incorporates many of the principles of lean manufacturing, such as continuous
improvement and the elimination of non-value added work. The first half of this thesis
focuses on the Six Sigma framework because of Raytheon's strong commitment to the
approach, rather than the larger set of issues in lean manufacturing.
Typically, the vertical integration decision is one of the key strategic choices facing a
firm. The fire crippled Raytheon's substrate fabrication area and changed this decision
from a strategic one to a tactical one. Rebuilding the substrate capability in El Segundo
would require close to a year. In the short term, Raytheon was forced to shift substrate
production from El Segundo to external suppliers or alternate internal sites.
The second half of this thesis (Chapter 7 and Chapter 8) addresses the issues associated
with outsourcing a technically complex product. The initial substrate offload accelerated
the timeframe for establishing suppliers and for dealing with concerns like intellectual
property, coordination, dependency and the strategic consequences of outsourcing a key
technology. This thesis attempts to address these implementation issues as well as the
strategic implications of outsourcing substrates.
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Title: Senior Lecturer of Management, Sloan School of Management
Thesis Supervisor: David Simchi-Levi
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Chapter 1: Project Context
The Fire
On July 6 th, a fire started under one of the hoods in Raytheon's Solid State Microwave
(SSM) business unit. Solid State Microwave includes substrate and circulator
production, which feed the antenna value stream (discussed below), as well as microwave
integrated circuit (MIC) production. SSM provides inputs across many of Raytheon's
product lines. Because of SSM's upstream position in the value stream, problems at SSM
can ripple through the entire organization and lead to employee furloughs, internal
schedule slips and even final customer delivery delays further downstream.
The fire added to Raytheon's challenges, but it also created an energy and openness to
change. A cross-functional team which cut across the entire organization was pulled
together in the immediate aftermath of the fire. The team first stabilized the area, and
then catalogued the damage and impact to the business. Although the fire damage was
extensive no one was injured and it was contained within the substrate fabrication area, a
single room. Production throughout the area was stopped for 21 days and the substrate
fabrication area, where the fire started, was taken off-line indefinitely. Secondary water
damage from the more than 400,000 gallons of water used to fight the fire caused
extensive damage throughout SSM.
The most severe consequences were avoided through the fire recovery team's exceptional
efforts, but the fire and subsequent water damage estimates were in the millions of
dollars. Photos of the substrate area immediately after the fire can be seen in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Aftermath of Fire
The Antenna System Value Stream
Raytheon's Space and Airborne Systems (SAS) business designs and manufactures
products to enhance space and airborne missions, including active arrays for military
aircraft. Active array antenna systems can both transmit and receive beams. These
arrays enable pilots to electronically steer portions of the array to simultaneously navigate
and track objects. Prior to active arrays, navigation and tracking could not be done
concurrently.
The antenna system value stream is shown in Figure 2. This thesis focuses on substrates
and magnet sub-assemblies, the furthest upstream inputs into the antenna system.
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Figure 2: Antenna System Value Stream
Substrates
* 200 types
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Circulators
- 20 types Stick Sub-
5 "families" Assemblies
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Array
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Source: Krishnan, Satish, 2004. Driving a Lean Transfbrination Using a Six Sigma Improvement Process,
Mechanical Engineering and Management Program Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Value Stream Components
Manufacturing antenna systems is a complex process and spans across locations and
business units. In addition to local optimizations within these different areas, recent
efforts have focused on the integration across the process. This thesis focuses on
substrates and magnet sub-assemblies, which increased in importance following the fire
in Raytheon's substrate production area.
Substrates: Substrates provide the basic mechanical structure and interconnects for
different kinds of RF circuits. Prior to the fire, Raytheon produced over two hundred
types of substrates that fed both microwave integrated circuits (MICs) and RF circuits
(circulators). After the fire, substrate production was outsourced to three main vendors,
and substrate production for circulators went to a single vendor in the northeast.
Magnet Sub-Assemblies: Magnets are applied to the substrate and help to control the
flow of RF energy within a circuit. Magnets impact circulator performance. Magnet
discs are sourced from an outside vendor, but magnetization and assembly is done in-
13
.. ... .... .......
house within the circulator area. The simultaneous increase in circulator volumes and the
ratio of magnets to circulators has put increasing pressure on the magnet area.
Circulators: Circulators direct the flow of RF energy, allowing the circuit to transmit
and receive simultaneously. Circulators are often referred to as the "traffic cop" of the
antenna system. Energy is permitted to flow from the transmit port to the antenna port as
well as from the antenna port to the receive port. RF energy is prevented from flow from
the transmit port to the receive port. Circulators are relatively inexpensive, have low
energy loss and importantly require no power or signal to operate.
Stick Assemblies: Stick assemblies are the structural housings for the circulators. Four
types of "stick" assemblies exist and can be grouped in two families based on similarities
within production methods.
Antenna Arrays and Antenna Systems: Antenna systems built on circulator
technology allow a pilot to navigate the aircraft while tracking objects on the air and on
the ground.
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Chapter 2: Project Summary
Problem Statement (Burning Platform)
Raytheon refers to an identified need for change as a "burning platform". On July 6th
2004, this metaphor became a reality when a devastating fire at the El Segundo facility
crippled the Solid State Microwave (SSM) business. The fire halted circulator
production for nearly four weeks and forced Raytheon to outsource substrate production
for circulator products, which had previously been done in-house.
The fire exacerbated the key challenges facing the circulator area, which includes magnet
assembly.
Circulator demand was forecasted to growth four-fold over two years,
increasing the burden on operators and equipment. The growth in magnet
sub-assembly demand would be even greater as the ratio of magnets to
circulators was also forecasted to increase. The circulator and magnet
assembly processes needed to eliminate waste and optimize the use of current
resources.
The fire forced Raytheon to outsource substrate production. In addition to
production work, Raytheon relied on the substrate area for developing
substrate prototypes, a key part of the circulator design process. The co-
location of design engineers, substrate production and circulator production
allowed for the free flow of ideas and quick turn around on prototypes. In
additional to managing substrate supplier production, Raytheon needed to
develop a plan for maintaining innovation without an on-site substrate facility.
Problems with the outsourced substrates and other inputs like carriers and
magnet sub-assemblies led to cost overruns and schedule slips on a number of
programs.
15
Project Definition
Magnet sub-assemblies and substrates are important inputs in to the circulator process.
The impact of magnet assembly inefficiencies and the substrate offload on circulator
production and the antenna value stream is a recurrent theme in this thesis.
Magnet Assembly
The first half of this thesis applies the Six Sigma process improvement framework to
magnet assembly. Circulator production and magnet assembly are done in the same room
and share equipment and personnel resources. Although circulator and magnet assembly
are deeply linked, the management of these areas lacks continuity. The process for
circulator assembly is standardized, but the magnet assembly process is less clearly
defined and requires significant engineering supervision. Because of this, operations
management takes the lead on scheduling circulator lots and engineering takes the lead
on magnet assembly scheduling. The disconnect between the heavily interdependent
circulator and magnet assembly areas leads to many problems, discussed in detail later.
At the time of the internship, circulator costs on several key programs were running over
budget. The higher costs were attributed to an increase in labor expense caused by
damaged raw material that increased inspection and rework time. This thesis proposes
that there were also substantial hidden costs within the magnet assembly process.
Magnet assembly was generally viewed as filler work. An operator typically worked on
magnets in conjunction with a circulator assembly task and allocated labor costs to the
circulator task. Because of this it was difficult to really understand the true cost of
magnet assembly. The discussion in the following chapters proposes that the growing
inefficiencies in the magnet area were also contributing to labor cost overruns and uses
the Six Sigma framework to propose improvements.
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Substrate Offload
Raytheon produced substrates for circulators and microwave integrated circuits (MICs) at
its El Segundo site. The second half of this thesis focuses primarily on the outsourcing of
circulator substrates and the impact on circulator development and production.
Raytheon recognized the need to outsource a portion of substrate production prior to the
fire. A technical team within Raytheon had begun benchmarking the capabilities of the
supplier base. Raytheon had also been working to understand the costs of producing
different substrate types in-house, in order to better compare costs by substrate type with
outside suppliers. The El Segundo site produced more than 200 substrate varieties, with a
wide range of complexity and technical sophistication. The intention was never to
outsource all of substrate production, but to select commodity substrates for outsourcing
while maintaining newer, propriety technologies for in-house production.
For the circulator based products, substrates are an integral part of development and the
key driver of performance of the overall antenna system. Circulator substrates are a
highly customized product and the supplier base for these types of substrates is very
limited. Although the fire necessitated the outsourcing of substrates in the short term,
reestablishing at least some circulator substrate capability internally is an important
strategic consideration for Raytheon. This thesis examines the initial implementation of
the substrate offload as well the strategic considerations for outsourcing substrates.
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Project Goals
The goals of this project are to:
o Eliminate inefficiencies in magnet assembly by applying the Six Sigma
process improvement framework (Chapter 4 through Chapter 7)
Provide a framework for making longer term substrate outsourcing decisions
(Chapter 8)
Understand and develop tools for mitigating the risks associated with the
circulator substrate offload for both production and design work (Chapter 9)
18
Chapter 3: Six Sigma - Visualize, Commit & Prioritize
Six Sigma Framework
The Six Sigma process was originally implemented at Motorola in the early 1980s in an
effort to improve quality measurement. It was aimed at minimizing waste and producing
identical product with extremely low defect rates.1 Like many companies, Raytheon has
adopted its own version of the Six Sigma process, which is based on benchmarking with
Allied Signal and General Electric. It expands on the Motorola Six Sigma process, which
focused on design and manufacturing, and includes all organizational processes and
functions.
Raytheon Six Sigma is essentially a roadmap for implementing change. It involves six
steps: Visualize, Commit, Prioritize, Characterize, Improve and Achieve. Although Six
Sigma incorporates many of the ideas of lean manufacturing it differs in its objective.
Six Sigma is a method for implementing change, while lean manufacturing defines the
nature of the changes.
The Six Sigma method attempts to define value in terms of the customer, identify the
value stream, eliminate waste and variation, make value flow at the pull of the customer
and continuously improve. All of these ideas are attributes of a lean manufacturing
system. The Six Sigma framework provides a method for identifying and implementing
various aspects of lean.
Visualize
The first step in the Six Sigma process is to define the clear and pressing need for change
and create a vision for the future.
Magnet Sub-Assembly Process
Magnets are an often overlooked component in the antenna value stream. The low cost
of magnet discs can be misleading and result in underestimating the total cost of the
'Source: http://www.isixsiema.com/library/content/c02O8l5a.asp accessed on April 2, 2005
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magnet sub-assembly process. Magnet assembly is an ad-hoc and poorly defined
process, which requires significant labor and engineering supervision to ensure it is done
correctly. Also, there is a disconnect between the management of magnet production and
the management of circulator production. Both magnets and circulators utilize the same
personnel resources and share the same physical space, making it essential for there to be
clear communication and coordination between the two areas. Problems with magnet
assembly highlight several clear needs:
o To simplify and standardize the magnet sub-assembly process
o To monitor and track magnet assembly costs
o To integrate magnet sub-assembly with downstream circulator demand
o To develop an inventory control system for magnets
In addition to these tactical improvements, a value stream analysis throws in to question
the amount of value being added by the magnet sub-assembly process. The majority of
steps performed in magnet assembly are done to prepare the magnets to interface with
circulator assembly robots downstream and do not add any value to the end customer.
An entire shift might be spent positioning the magnets for further processing, without
making any meaningful impact on the magnets themselves. Value is defined by the
ultimate customer (Womack & Jones, 2003, p. 20). Although there are legitimate reasons
for many of the magnet sub-assembly steps, shifting magnets between plates does not
create value for the end customer.
Commit
The second step in the Six Sigma process is to commit. No project is successful unless
the vision of the project is aligned with the vision of the people responsible for
implementing and maintaining its results. Across the circulator area and its inputs,
aligning the vision of key stakeholders can be a difficult task. Over the past two years,
Raytheon has been transitioning the management of circulator production, which includes
magnet assembly, from its engineering to its operations organization.
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Thanks in part to the work done during Satish's internship there has been significant
progress in aligning the vision for circulator assembly, but the vision for magnet
assembly has lagged behind. The impact of inefficiencies within magnet assembly is
often overlooked. The support of the Director of the area as well as several key members
of the operations and engineering staff has helped draw more attention to the growing
cost of magnet assembly as well as the impact magnets have further up the value stream.
Quantifying the cost of schedule delays, equipment failures and increased labor generated
by magnets has also created a greater willingness to improve the process.
Raytheon has a strong commitment to the Six Sigma process and the culture of
continuous improvement. Raytheon has worked hard to disperse Six Sigma process
knowledge through all ranks and businesses. At the time of the internship, 100% of
salaried and more than 50% of bargaining unit employees in SSM had been certified as
Six Sigma specialists. Areas for improvement are openly discussed at weekly meetings
with the engineering and operations organization. Daily meetings at the beginning of
each shift are also used to brainstorm potential improvements and communicate changes.
Prioritize
The third step in the Six Sigma process is to prioritize. To successfully complete a large
project it is necessary to set and prioritize goals. This defines the project scope and
identifies resource needs. Without a clear plan of action it is difficult to know when you
have veered off-course.
The action plan for implementing Six Sigma in the magnet sub-assembly area includes
the following goals:
" To understand and measure the costs associated with magnet assembly.
Identify inefficiencies within the process.
" To simplify, standardize and document magnet assembly processes.
" To develop a visual inventory control system for assembled magnets.
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* To develop tools for integrating magnet assembly in to the circulator
production tools. Magnet assembly shares resources with circulator assembly
and should be reflected in circulator resource planning.
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Chapter 4: Six Sigma - Characterize
Characterize is the fourth step in the Raytheon Six Sigma process. Data was gathered
through interviews and time studies. Manufacturing metrics, present and future value
stream mapping and six sigma training tools like identifying undesirable effects were
used to analyze and identify problems.
Magnet Sub-Assembly Process
Magnet assembly is a very simple process. Metal discs are magnetized, stabilized
through temperature cycling and dealt out on plates in order to interface with the
automated machinery in the circulator assembly process. The magnet assembly process
varies depending on two attributes: (1) whether or not magnets have pre-attached spacers
and (2) whether magnets require screening.
Pre-attached Spacers: For a small number of product lines, spacers are attached to
magnets during magnet assembly. The resulting magnet sub-assembly is then attached to
the substrate in one step during circulator assembly. For product lines without pre-
attached spacers, the spacers and magnets are attached separately during circulator
assembly, in two steps.
Screened versus Unscreened: A more meaningful difference in processing can be
found between screened and unscreened magnet products. The strength of each magnet
in a given magnet lot is not identical. Magnets are screened where necessary to meet
circulator performance requirements with high test yields. This is not required on all
programs. For programs where the circulator design is sufficiently robust to handle the
normal magnet variation screening is not required. Because the process for screening
magnets is still being developed, products requiring screening have more than double the
processing time and significant support from the engineering organization.
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Magnet Process Flows
Magnets are processed and stored on steel plates measuring fifteen inches by nine inches.
Each plate stores approximately 1,000 magnets and magnets are between 100 and 300
mils in diameter. The number of each type of magnet needed for an antenna system
varies by program from less than one hundred to close to twenty thousand.
Unscreened Magnets
The magnet process flow for unscreened magnet products is shown below in Figure 3.
Equipment utilized is shown in blue text in parentheses and estimated process times per
1,000 magnets (one plate) are shown below. The process for unscreened magnets is very
straightforward and involves a limited number of steps and only three pieces of
equipment. Metal discs are put in to plastic tubes (TUBE) and magnetized. The
magnetized discs are removed from the tubes and placed in stacks on a metal plate in
preparation for stabilization in the oven (MAGNETIZE & PREP). Once stabilized
(CYCLE TEMP), magnets are dealt out one by one on to a fifteen by nine inch magnet
storage plate (PLATE).
Figure 3: Unscreened/No pre-attached Spacer Process flow
TUBE MAGNETIZE & CYCLE PLATE
> PREP - TEMP ( )
D( MAGNETIZER) (OVEN) (SEIKO I) WIP
30min 15min | 4hr15min 4hr
Note: Times are standard estimates for a magnet plate of 1,00() magnets
Screened Magnets
The process for screened magnets is more complex than the unscreened process. The
primary loop (processes in orange) includes the steps for unscreened magnets in addition
to the testing (TEST) and binning (BIN/SORT), where acceptable magnets are identified
and grouped together on designated plates.
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The process flow in Figure 4 is for a screened magnet product which uses pre-attached
spacers. The interaction between magnets is a problem for magnets with pre-attached
spacers. Spacers are attached using epoxy, which must be baked in order to cure the seal.
When magnets with pre-attached spacers were placed in close proximity prior to curing,
the magnets would shift and alter the position of the spacer. To overcome this problem,
magnets for even and odd positions on the plate are dealt out on the plates separately and
the plate is baked in between to fix the seal between the magnets and spacers.
The secondary loop (processes in gray) was also put in place to overcome the magnet
interaction discussed above. In order to have a balanced force on each of the magnets on
the plate, approximately 65 border magnets were manually added to each plate later in
the process.
Figure 4: Screened/Pre-attached Spacer Process Flow
1 hr
B rder
2hrs Magnets
NPLATeE
.A .1M0Yfr ZSpacers
MAGNETIZE & STABILIZE PLATE/ CREATE BAKE
/Discs PEAEFRCYCLE TEMP ASSEMBLY - evenOVEN (SEIKO 11)
20min 4hrs15Smin 2hrs 1hr
3hrs 3.5hrs 1 hr 2hrs
BIN/SORT TEST BAKE PLATE/ CREATE
(SEIKO 3) 4 (SEIKO 3) *4 - ASSEMBLY -odd 4--
Magnet/ (SEIKO 1)
Spacer
1hr Spaces
Note: Times are standards estimates for a magnet plate of 1,000 magnets
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True Cost of Magnet Assembly
As described in previous chapters, magnet assembly is an often overlooked process.
Because labor is not directly allocated to the process, the true cost is not understood.
Based on time studies done over two days, operators spent an average of 15% of their
time on magnet assembly while billing their labor to other processes. Because the
magnet assembly costs are hidden, there is limited incentive to address inefficiencies in
the process.
The machine for dealing magnets out on plates was designed to be able to run for more
than three hours with no operator assistance. Currently, even under ideal conditions it
runs for at most 30 minutes uninterrupted and can stop as frequently as every few
minutes. A graph showing machine downtime and required operator supervision can be
seen in Figure 5. The green bars represent when the machine is running unaided (53%),
the yellow bars when the machine is running under supervision, the orange bars when the
machine is stopped (33%), and the red bars when the machine is both stopped and being
serviced (12%).
In addition to operator time, a significant amount of engineering supervision was needed
to ensure that the non-standardized process was performed correctly. Based on this data,
magnets contribute significantly to labor costs that are not attributed to the magnet
assembly process.
Figure 5: Magnet Shooter Time Study
Legend: Shoe Std
I- perating (Green) Magnet Shooter Time Study
2 - Operating under supervision (Yellow)
3 - Stopped (Orange)
4 - Stopped under supervision (Ped)
4
2
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Value Creation
When evaluating a process for improvement opportunities it is important to focus on the
contribution each process makes to the value of the product. Womack and Jones classify
actions in to three categories based on the value they add to a product: (1) those which
create value to the customer; (2) those which create no value but are required by the
process (Type I muda); and (3) those that don't create value or aid the process and can be
eliminated immediately (Type II muda) (Womack & Jones, 2003, p. 39).
Type I Muda
The basic role of the magnet assembly process is to prepare the magnets for loading on to
a machine further downstream. The tubing of magnets and the dealing out of magnets on
plates adds no value to the end customer and they act solely as enablers of the current
production process (Type I muda). Together these to steps represent fifty percent of the
processing time for unscreened magnet products. Within the unscreened magnet process
only magnetization and stabilization through cycling temperature make a fundamental
change to the end product.
The screened magnet process creates more value for the customer because the testing of
magnets has an impact on the performance of the product, but it still contains many
process-enabling, non-value added steps such as dealing the magnets out on plates.
Type 11 Muda
In addition to the Type I muda discussed above, the magnet assembly process has a
number of steps that add no value to the customer or to the process and can be classified
as Type II muda. A key tool in the Raytheon Six Sigma process is the identification of
undesirable effects in the current state. Undesirable effects are direct observations of key
problems in the process. Several such conditions existed for the magnet process and are
identified below.
o Magnet Tooling: The process for dealing magnets out on plates was designed to
be automated. The original goal of the tooling was to have it operate
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uninterrupted for up to three hours. Age and problems with the software for the
tooling has resulted in the machine operating unaided for at most 30 minutes,
even under ideal conditions. On many occasions it runs for only a few minutes
before requiring operator attention.
The unreliable machines require large amounts of operator attention. Data
gathered over a two day period found that operators spent an average of 15% of
their time on magnet assembly (see Figure 5).
o Dirty/Discolored magnets: The machine that deals magnets out on plates relies
on optical sensors to locate the magnets. During the stabilization process, certain
magnet metals become discolored, making it difficult for them to be "seen" by the
magnet sensor. Unseen magnets are skipped and can cause additional
complications for the already finicky magnet tooling.
In response to the dirty magnets problem, operators clean the magnets by pressing
them to tape to remove the dirt. Because of the small size of the magnets this
process can take an entire shift for a single plate of magnets.
o Magnets too largefor tooling: Several programs use magnets that are too
large for the existing magnet tooling. In this case, operators must manually load
each magnet on to the machine that deals out magnets. Not only does this require
more labor, it also is more likely to result in mistakes like incorrect polarity.
o Single Points of Failure: Because the magnet assembly process is not codified
or documented, it is highly reliant on the localized knowledge and input of the
engineering staff. Many "single points of failure" can be seen throughout the
process. Often, if the person needed to answer a magnet related question is not
available, production halts until they can be tracked down.
o Pre-attached spacers: The use of pre-attached spacers contributes unnecessary
complexity to the process. Pre-attached spacers require the dealing out on plates
to occur in two steps and it creates the need for "work-arounds", like the use of
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border magnets. Also, when too much epoxy is used or the epoxy is not applied
exactly on center, magnets with pre-attached spacers can get glued to the plate,
increasing attrition and process time and possibly causing quality problems.
o Unnecessary steps: Many steps, like the time consuming processing of border
magnets, require significant resources, but add no value to the customer or to the
product. Border magnets were put in place to overcome the problems caused by
magnet interaction while maintaining the 1,000 magnets per plate. Border
magnets can be eliminated simply by allowing for plates with fewer than 1,000
magnets. Eliminating the use of pre-attached spacers should also be considered.
Without pre-attached spacers, both border magnets and the need to plate odd and
even magnet positions in separate steps disappear.
o Disorganization: Both empty and full magnet plates are stored in a series of
shelves in the magnet storage unit (See Figure 6). Many of the plates contain
unique magnet plate numbers, but approximately a quarter are unlabeled. Usable
and unusable magnets are stored next to one another and someone "in the know"
often needs to direct operators on which plates to use and which lots to process.
o Unnecessary Rework: Rework in the magnet process can often be traced back
to the lack of organization. Magnets are placed on the wrong plates or a lack of
documentation that a step has been completed leads to steps being done more than
once or on the wrong plates.
o Poor Communication: Although magnet assembly feeds circulator assembly
and the areas share resources and equipment, there is limited coordination
between them.
o Raw Material Problems: Circulator inputs, like carriers, arrive damaged and
operators are spending time inspecting each part prior to processing. Inspection
also occurs at other points in the process and there is not a clear boundary
between identifying quality problems and potential over inspection.
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o Developing Process for Screening Magnets: The method for screening
magnets is not fully developed. The measurement tools and tolerances around
this process are still being defined. Due to magnet strength distribution
differences across lots, unique bin ranges are currently created for each lot. With
the establishment of uniform bin ranges, the testing and sorting steps could
happen simultaneously, saving two to three hours for each plate of 1,000 magnets.
Figure 6: Magnet Storage Unit
Impact on circulator production
When volume through an unstable process increases, problems become more visible.
The simultaneous increase in both the number of circulators produced and the number of
magnets per circulator brought to light previously hidden challenges in the magnet area.
Although at the time of the internship there was sufficient capacity in the magnet area to
meet circulator needs, the projected increase in multiple magnet circulators could rapidly
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lead to magnet assembly becoming the process bottleneck. Also, true magnet capacity is
overestimated because unreliable magnet tooling cannot run at theoretical rates.
In addition to the lack of standardization and high cost of magnet assembly, problems in
the area have impacts further down the value chain. Circulator production is put on hold
when magnets are not ready in time. Because magnets enter the circulator line in the
middle of production, scheduling slips can cause a circulator lot to be stopped in the
middle of its run, greatly increasing cycle time and delaying production of other lots in
the queue.
As volumes increase, magnet assembly is taking up more operator time. Operators are
often pulled away from circulator assembly in order to deal with magnet problems.
Circulator operators work on magnet assembly as filler for downtime. While the
intention was to utilize operators during automated parts of the circulator assembly
process, the practice often pulls operators away from concentration intensive tasks, such
as inspection. The decreased reliability of the magnet tooling with age and increased use
has made this problem more severe.
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Chapter 5: Six Sigma - Improve
The fifth step in the Raytheon Six Sigma framework is to improve. During the improve
phase, data that is gathered and analyzed during the Characterize and Prioritize stages is
synthesized and applied to create positive change.
Magnet Sub-Assembly Improvements
As a result of the analysis discussed in Chapter 5, many areas of improvement were
identified and implemented. While some improvements are relatively simple to put in
place (Quick Fixes), others require more fundamental change and were not completed by
the end of the internship (Longer Term Solutions). For each of the changes described
below the undesirable effects addressed are listed in parentheses.
Quick Fixes
" Elimination of Border Magnets (Unnecessary Steps) - Border magnets are used
solely to have 1,000 magnets on each plate. Although this does reduce the need
for magnet storage plates since approximately 65 more magnets can be stored on
each, it does not add any true value to the process. Creating and placing border
magnets around the edge of the plate adds approximately two hours of labor for
each magnet plate. At current volumes this adds up to twenty hours per month.
" Pre-tubed Magnets (Unnecessary Steps): For a couple of programs, magnets
from the supplier are provided in tubes at no additional cost. There is no reason
why all programs should not be using pre-tubed magnets, eliminating a non-value
added operator step.
* Schedule Linking Circulator and Magnet Production (Single Points of
Failure, Poor Communication) - The planning tool used to schedule circulator
lots was expanded to include magnet assembly status, improving coordination and
reducing schedule slips. Magnet and circulator production are now scheduled
using the same tool allowing for better resource allocation and improved
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information on upcoming magnet needs. The visual circulator production chart,
which shows the status of current lots on the floor, was expanded to include
magnet assembly status.
* Organization of Magnet Storage Unit (Disorganization, Unnecessary Rework,
Single Points of Failure) - Labels were created to enforce an "every plate has its
place" rule and aid in controlling and tracking magnets through the system. Each
magnet shelf has a unique code that corresponds to the same code on a magnet
plate. Colored electrical tape was used to divide the storage area in to product
line specific sections and magnet plates were coded by program. Since different
plate finishes are used for programs with pre-attached spacers and programs
without pre-attached spacers, identifying the plates by program eliminates costly
mistakes and associated rework. The new organization gives operators a better
understanding of what needs to be done and makes them less reliant on direction
from the engineering staff. It also gives a quick view of magnet inventories,
highlighting shortages before they hold up production.
* Magnet Inventory System (Disorganization, Single Points of Failure): The
reorganized storage unit provides a visual indicator of current magnet inventories,
enabling a continuous review inventory model. Magnet re-order points and lot
sizes were established for each program based on available storage space and
demand.
There are many motivations for holding inventory including economies of scale,
logistics and protecting against uncertainties in demand and lead time. For
magnets, the most important of these factors is the protection against uncertainties
in lead time. As described above the magnet process lacks predictability.
Unreliable equipment and lack of information lead to highly variable process lead
times. Without inventory protection, longer than expected lead times can lead to
schedule slips further down the value stream.
There are also costs associated with inventories, including holding costs, order
costs and shortage costs. Holding costs include the cost of the physical space to
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store the items, breakage, obsolescence and the opportunity cost of alternative
investments. Order costs include set up costs for internally produced inventory
and receiving, handling and explicit vendor charges for externally procured
inventory.
The Economic Order Ouantity (EOO) Model
EOQ is the simplest inventory model and provides the basis for more complex
models. By assuming a known and constant demand, no shortages, no order lead
time and known set up cost, order cost and holding cost, the model predicts the
optimal order quantity Q* for each product (Nahmias, 1997, p. 213).
Q* = 2KA /h (Equation 1)
Variables for each product i are defined as:
Q*(i) = economic order quantity
K(i) = fixed order cost
(i) = demand per period
h = holding cost per unit per period
The simplest version of EOQ does not include order lead time or constraints
imposed by budget or space limits for inventory, both of which are important
factors for magnet sub-assembly inventories and are addressed below.
Variability in Lead Time
The Continuous Review Model expands EOQ to include lead time uncertainty
and assumptions of service level. (Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky, Simchi-Levi, 2003, p.
62). The previous EOQ model assumed no lead time and Q* was ordered when
inventory reached zero. A positive lead time requires a reorder point greater than
zero to accommodate lead time demand. Also, because there is uncertainty in the
magnet assembly process, there is variability in the lead time and therefore the
demand over the lead time.
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For each product the following variables are defined and used to determine Q*
and the optimal reorder point, s:
K(i)
pdemand(i)
pleadtime(i)
ulead-time(i)
ademand (i)
h
a
= fixed order cost
= average demand per day
= average lead time (days)
= standard deviation of lead time
= standard deviation of daily demand
= holding cost per item per unit time
= service level with probability of stocking out equal to 1 - a
The reorder level, s, consists of two components, the average inventory required
during lead time and the buffer inventory or safety stock that accommodates any
variations in lead time demand.
The second component, safety stock, depends on the safety factor, z, derived from
the targeted service level. The safety factor, which protects against lead time
shortages, is chosen to ensure that the probability of stockouts is exactly 1- a. A
z-value of 1.29 assumes a 10% probability of stockout and a z-value of 2.05
assumes a 2% probability of stockouts. Magnet assembly lead time is based on
internal production and is not dependent on an external supplier so management
has some ability to expedite essential orders. Because of this, a lower service
level of 90% is probably acceptable.
The reorder level for each product, i is calculated as follows:
s = udemand x plead _ time + zVulead _ time x U2 demand + p 2 demand x &s lead _ time
(Equation 2)
In reality, the demand is known, but there is significant demand variability. The
adernand term is used to represent demand variability and not uncertainty.
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Constraints on Magnet Storage
The Continuous Review Model does not take in to account potential constraints
on budget or physical space available to store inventory. The magnet storage unit
has a finite capacity and for product lines with with Q* plus safety stock
exceeding available capacity. EOQ should be calculated incorporating these
constraints, which can be done through the use of Lagrange multipliers.
" Improved Documentation (Disorganization, Poor Communication, Single
Points of Failure): The addition of magnet lot numbers to the circulator process
routers provides a mechanism for measuring the impact of magnets on high level
assembly performance. Previously there was no way to trace what magnet lots
went in to what antenna systems.
" Process Changes (Magnets too Large fJr Tooling): Magnets for several programs
are manually loaded on to the magnet plates. Later, during circulator assembly
they are removed from the plates and applied to the circulator substrate. With a
simple coding update these magnets could be manually loaded during circulator
assembly. Although this would still be more labor intensive than the traditional
automated process it would reduce cycle time by approximately four hours for
every 1,000 magnets. Instead of manually loading the magnets on to plates,
where they would then need to be picked for circulator assembly, the magnets
could be manually loaded to circulator assembly.
Longer Term Solutions
Many of the problems with the magnet process can be attributed to Type I muda, actions
that add no value, but are currently required for the production process and Type II muda,
actions that add no value and can be immediately discontinued. The improvements
discussed above mainly address Type II muda. Because eliminating Type I muda
requires changes to the production process, these improvements are often more difficult
and timely to implement.
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* Elimination of Dealing Out Magnets on Plates: As mentioned in previous
chapters many of the magnet assembly steps add little value to the end consumer.
Raytheon should investigate easier ways for magnets to be prepared for future
circulator assembly, such as using stacks or tubes of magnets for circulator
assembly and eliminating the need to put magnets on plates. This is particularly
appealing for unscreened magnet products, which do not require any additional
testing or grouping once they are magnetized and stabilized.
Eliminating magnet plates offers other advantages in addition to significant
savings in process and operator time. Right now, a very small volume of product
takes up a huge footprint within the circulator lab. If circulator assembly was
configured to interface with stacks instead of plates of magnets, the large storage
bin shown in Figure 6 could be removed, freeing up much needed floor space.
Also, the dealing out of magnets on plates utilizes large, expensive equipment that
could be adapted to other uses within Raytheon or sold.
0 Limited Tracking of Magnet Assembly Costs: There is a trade-off between the
cost of inaccurate cost data and the cost of measurement (Cooper & Kaplan, 1999,
p. 216). By not allocating the true resource costs to magnet assembly, Raytheon
is getting a skewed picture of the expense. However, the cost of monitoring and
tracking technician and engineering labor costs of the area could be extensive.
Raytheon should seek a balance between the cost of inaccurate information being
used to make decisions and the cost of measurement. Simple tools to get a
ballpark figure on operator time based on the number of equipment stoppages and
average time to service would be relatively inexpensive to implement and shed
light on the hidden costs of magnet assembly.
* Combining Testing and Binning in to One Step: Right now the information to
create screened magnet subgroups is done separately from the actual physical
grouping of the magnets. Because the parameters for the magnet subgroups are
not standardized across lots, the magnet strength for each magnet in a lot must be
recorded before parameters for that lot are defined. During physical testing
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magnets are lifted off the plate for testing and replaced in their original position.
After all magnets are tested, they are then lifted off the plate and moved to a
designated plate based on the pre-recorded magnet strength.
The engineering staff is currently working towards pre-defined strength
parameters that would enable the simultaneous testing and physical segmenting of
magnets, potentially cutting process time for each plate of magnets by three to
four hours. There are several complexities that might make this difficult. First,
the variability in magnet strength across lots makes it difficult to define magnet
grouping parameters ahead of time. Also, the change would require a significant
investment in rewriting the software that currently runs the process.
* Consider Magnet Outsourcing: Raytheon should consider whether it should be
processing magnets at all. Although testing and binning of magnets do have an
impact on performance, the tubing, magnetization, stabilization and organizing of
magnets are not core capabilities for Raytheon. At least some parts of the magnet
assembly process might be pushed back to the metal disc providers.
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Chapter 6: Achieve
Achieve is the final step in the Six Sigma process. Once improvements have been
identified they must be implemented, measured and sustained in order for changes to
have a lasting impact on the organization.
Among the steps that must be completed to ensure that achievement is sustained are:
* Defining responsibilities and support for the revised process
" Training, education and communication of the new process
" Measurement to track results and compare against expectations
* Maintaining focus on continuous improvement
Metrics and Measurement
In order to ensure that changes to the magnet assembly process actually improve
performance, several metrics should be used to track progress. Right now various
statistics are kept for circulator production such as lead time, yield, on-time delivery
percentages and labor costs. There is very limited data collection for magnet assembly,
which be contributing to the tendency of management to overlook problems with the
magnet assembly process.
Any time metrics are proposed there is a trade-off between the amount of time and
resources needed to track information and the amount of value that can be captured from
that information. The following measures would provide valuable insight in to the
predictability of the magnet process with minimal investment on the part of management.
* Lead time: The lead time for magnet assembly is difficult to predict. Equipment
problems and the use of magnet assembly as filler work contribute to lead time
variability, increasing the schedule risk for the overall value chain. A better
understanding of the lead time can also be used to more closely estimate the
required inventory for magnet sub-assemblies.
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* Magnet-related Circulator Delays: Magnet assembly is often overlooked because
the impact on the process further up the value chain is not fully realized.
Recording the number of circulator schedule slips stemming from magnet sub-
assembly delays will help highlight the importance of this process to the overall
system.
* Operator Labor Estimate: Allocating direct labor cost to the magnet assembly
process would likely require a greater investment than the anticipated gains the
new information would bring. However, some insight in to the time operators are
spending assembling magnets is needed. Without any information on magnet
labor, management may overestimate circulator labor and make inappropriate
decisions.
A couple of simple tools can be used to estimate magnet assembly labor with
minimal added expense:
- Record Magnet Tooling Maintenance: Combining a simple tally of the
number of times operators service the magnet equipment and an estimate
of standard service time can provide a rough approximation of magnet
related labor.
- Operator Survey: Asking operators to asses the percentage of time they
spend working on magnets each week can also be used to estimate direct
magnet assembly labor.
* Engineering hours/week: One of the biggest hidden costs associated with magnet
assembly is the amount of engineering support required to monitor the process.
Much of the work that engineering does for magnet assembly is not related to
innovation, but rather to process management and should be transitioned to
Operations Management within the circulator area.
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Sustaining Achievement
Sustaining improvement is equally important to the initial achievement and must be
worked on throughout the Six Sigma process. From as early on as the vision statement it
is important to gather support from throughout the organization, particularly among the
people responsible for managing change on a day to day basis. In order to ensure that the
improvements generated by the Six Sigma process would be institutionalized it was
essential to involve key stakeholders from the beginning. Ideas were generated from the
broad group working in the circulator area, including Operators, Operations
Management, Process Engineering and Design Engineering.
Although buy in from stakeholders is important, additional steps also need to be taken.
Some of the process changes put in place can be understand implicitly. The new
organization of the magnet storage unit is an example of this type of change. Other
changes, like the inventory management system require training and documentation to
ensure the improvements are adopted. In an effort to support the changes in the magnet
area, a set of run rules was drafted and is posted in the magnet assembly area. Operators
were involved in developing various process improvements and training on revisions to
the process were communicated during the daily morning meeting.
Conclusion
Six Sigma process change attempts to examine all aspects of a process in an effort to
define the value stream, specify value in the eyes of the customer, eliminate waste and
variation and continuously improve in the pursuit of perfection. The Six Sigma
framework gives employees a common language to discuss and implement change.
Several important lessons came out of applying the Six Sigma framework to the magnet
assembly process. First, it highlighted the necessity of looking at a problem from more
than one point of view. Incorporating information from the diverse group of stakeholders
impacted by magnet assembly gave a deeper knowledge of the underlying drivers of the
current process. Also, it is essential to understand what is important to key stakeholders
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to successfully sell change. Finally, focusing on a small, often overlooked process like
magnets highlighted that seemingly simple processes can hide significant costs.
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Chapter 7: Supplier Management - Vertical Integration
Decision
The decision about what to outsource is one of the most crucial that a firm can make.
This chapter analyzes the choice to outsource circulator substrates independent of the
fire, which made outsourcing, at least in the short term, unavoidable.
Beckman and Rosenfield lay out a framework for making a vertical integration or
disintegration decision by examining four dimensions: strategic factors, which focus on
the criticality of the function to the firm's core business, market factors within the
industry such as the available supplier base, product and technology factors and
economic factors, which consider the cost trade-offs between outsourcing and retaining
ownership (Beckman and Rosenfield, Chapter 2). In an ideal world, companies would
own only activities within its core capabilities and would outsource others. However, the
decision is more complex when evaluated in the context of capacity needs, potential
business disruptions, such as the fire, quality of the supplier base and economic
considerations.
Strategic Factors: Core Capabilities Screen
Although in some applications substrates can be viewed as a commodity product,
circulator substrates are integral to circulator design and antenna system performance.
Much of the innovation in the antenna systems takes place at the substrate level. The
critical and integral nature of substrate design to circulators makes it core to Raytheon's
business.
Capacity/Capability Factors
Charles Fine discusses the role of dependency, which would be a subset of strategic
factors within the Beckman and Rosenfield framework. The need for outsourcing may
result from two categories of dependence: dependency for knowledge and dependency
for capacity (Fine, 1998, p. 166). Raytheon's internally produced substrates fed several
product lines, including microwave integrated circuits (MICs) and circulators. Prior to
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the fire, Raytheon was independent for knowledge, but recognized its growing
dependence for capacity as volumes increased. One of the reasons the substrate area was
chosen as the initial target for this project was Raytheon's desire to explore the use of
lean to increase substrate production capacity without a large capital investment. While
Raytheon wanted to evaluate how lean manufacturing techniques could be used to
increase capacity, it had begun to prepare for the inevitability of outsourcing.
Market Factors
Beckman and Rosenfield address three major market factors: market reliability,
aggregation of demand and market structure. Market reliability refers to the ability of the
supplier base to meet cost, availability, quality and feature needs. Aggregation of
demand affects the ability of suppliers to achieve economies of scale. Market structure
identifies relative market power and interdependencies across the supply chain.
External Suppliers
In anticipation of additional substrate outsourcing, a significant amount of work had been
done to benchmark suppliers in the months leading up to the fire. The supplier base for
the garnet-based substrates used in circulators was very limited and consisted of a few
small, specialized players. There were few suppliers with the capability to produce them
and all available suppliers would need some training and technical support in order to
become operational. Even the raw materials used for circulator substrates are only
provided by a few specialized suppliers. The overall supply chain for antenna systems is
shown in Figure 2. A more detailed look at the value chain for circulators is shown in
Figure 7.
Only two of the major defense contractors are large players in circulator development.
The potential substrate suppliers for the circulator industry are highly fragmented and
typically specialize in a technology or material type. Although several suppliers had the
equipment and capacity to produce substrates, the specialized technical knowledge
required for circulator substrates was difficult to find. Raytheon chose to outsource
circulator substrates to an East Coast supplier that had previous experience on one of the
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less complex circulator products. The supplier had more than sufficient capacity, but
required significant technical support from Raytheon's design and process engineers prior
to beginning production.
Internal Suppliers
Raytheon's Texas facility had an advanced substrate fabrication suited for high volume
production. Raytheon El Segundo outsourced the majority of its microwave integrated
circuit (MIC) substrates to Texas following the fire. The decision to use the East Coast
supplier for the circulator substrates was based on its previous work on circulator
products and the belief that it could be operational in less time. The role of the Texas
facility is important when evaluating whether to rebuild El Segundo's capability or to
extend the capability of the Texas facility.
Vertical Market Failure
Stuckey and White highlight four reasons to vertically integrate: (1) the market is too
risky and unreliable, (2) companies in adjacent stages of the value chain have more
market power, (3) integration could be used to exploit market power and (4) the market is
young and the company must forward integrate to develop it (Stuckey & White, 1993, p.
71). The most important of these reasons for Raytheon is the first one, which can lead to
Vertical Market Failure (VMF). VMF would be considered under the market factors
category in the Beckman and Rosenfield framework.
The typical features of a failed vertical market are (1) a small number of buyers and
sellers; (2) high asset specificity and (3) frequent transactions. Each of these conditions
holds for the circulator substrate market, increasing the risk for vertical disintegration.
Circulator substrates are an evolving technology and there are a small number of
fragmented providers. There is also a high degree of technical specificity. Like auto
assemblers and their component suppliers, who can be locked together by a component
that is specific to a make and model, each circulator substrate is unique and can only be
used by its designated product line. Finally, the high volume of circulator substrate
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product required frequent transactions although longer term price contracts can be
established.
Figure 7: Circulator Value Stream
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Product and Technology Factors
Vertical integration decisions require an understanding of the relationship among
technology knowledge, products or services that apply that technical knowledge and the
operations needed to produce and deliver those products or services (Beckman and
Rosenfield, Chapter 2). In Raytheon's case, the technical knowledge required for
circulator substrates was proprietary. Although there were multiple substrate suppliers,
the product is not standardized and Raytheon would need to share information and best
practices to get a supplier operational. Circulator substrates are integral to the
performance of the larger system, making it difficult to substitute alternative
technologies. On the operations front, outsourcing risks the knowledge that is gained
from refining a technical process. When manufacturing knowledge needs to be captured
and codified there is always a risk that the "know how" will be maintained, but the
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"know why" will be lost (Fan, Russell, Lunn, 2000, p. 17). An integrated technology for
which limited capabilities exist outside supports a decision to vertically integrate.
Economic Factors
The economic considerations for outsourcing were very different before and after the fire.
Prior to the fire many of the traditional cost benefit trade-offs were examined to
determine the desirability of outsourcing a subset of substrate products. Raytheon tried to
determine the internal cost of producing different substrate types in order to compare
external quotes with in-house production. This information could be used in conjunction
with analysis of which products utilized the most proprietary technology to selectively
outsource a subset of substrates.
While transportation costs are often a key economic factor when making an outsourcing
decision, the small size and light weight of substrates made transportation less of a
concern. There is some risk of product damage, however, since substrates are fragile and
require specialized packaging for protection.
After the fire, economic impact was still relevant, but the need to keep product going out
the door increased in importance. Raytheon still cared about the relative cost of
producing in-house versus purchasing from the outside. However, the decision became
whether to rebuild the substrate capability and where, instead of which substrates to
outsource if any. Also, the decision about whether to invest in internal capacity changed
significantly. No equipment from the substrate area was salvageable and to re-create the
previous capability would require a significant investment. Instead of evaluating whether
an updated or second machine might offer a sufficient return on investment, Raytheon
needed to consider whether it should rebuild its El Segundo substrate capability at El
Segundo or an alternate site or whether it should expand its capability in Texas.
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Vertically Integrate
In the absence of the fire, Raytheon should choose to maintain control of circulator
substrate production. Strategic concerns, market factors, product and technology and
economic factors all point to a vertically integrated strategy.
If the fire had not occurred, Raytheon's outsourcing decision would be easier. The
substrate capability already existed. Instead of being forced to outsource all products on
a very short time frame, Raytheon would have had the luxury to pick and choose what to
outsource from the more than 200 substrate types, outsourcing commodity substrates and
retaining newer, proprietary technologies, like garnet based substrates, in-house.
Following the fire, Raytheon has a very different choice. Instead of choosing to maintain
garnet based substrates in-house, it must decide whether or not to recreate the capability
internally. If it decides to recreate the capability, it must decide whether to do that at an
existing site, like Texas, or whether to build a new facility at El Segundo or another site.
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Chapter 8: Supplier Management - Substrate Off load
Implementation
When dealing with suppliers, companies typically focus on increasing speed and cost
effectiveness. Hau Lee contends that this increased efficiency does not give companies a
meaningful edge over competitors. Instead, his research identifies three very different
qualities as essential for top-performing supply chains: (1) agility, (2) the ability to adapt
to changing market structures and strategies, and (3) the alignment of the interests of all
firms across the supply chain (Lee, p. 104). These three elements together contribute to
the robustness of the supply chain, allowing an organization to respond to unforeseen
events, like the fire that disabled Raytheon's substrate production.
Agility has become even more critical in the past few years because there have been
frequent and severe shocks to the global supply chain, such as the September 1 1 h terrorist
attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., the SARS epidemic in Asia and the
dockworkers' strike in California. Lee focuses on several ways companies can build
agility into supply chains, including sharing information, developing collaborative
relationships, designing for part commonality, maintaining inventory on inexpensive,
small components, utilizing logistics systems and putting together a team that knows how
to invoke a backup plan.
The agility of Toyota's supply chain was evident in its fast rebound to a fire at its main
source supplier of a crucial brake valve (Wall Street Journal, May 1997). Most Toyota
plants kept only a four-hour supply and shortages of the $5 valve forced Toyota to shut
down all of its 20 auto plants in Japan, which built 14,000 cars per week. However, by
incorporating many of the methods suggested by Lee and described above, Toyota was
able to restart production in just five days. Toyota moved quickly to share information
and leveraged the strong collaborative relationships it had fostered with suppliers. After
the fire, Toyota executives were more convinced that using a small number of suppliers
with aligned incentives is the right approach. The fire did highlight some areas for
improvement and Toyota began an effort to trim the number of parts variations and build
contingency plans for sole-source suppliers.
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Implementation: Initial fire off-load
After the fire, Raytheon moved quickly to shore up relationships with key suppliers to
ensure that product continued to flow. The vast majority of unplanned substrate
outsourcing across all products was allocated to three key suppliers, two of which were
external and one of which was internal at Raytheon's Texas facility. All of the substrates
for circulators went to an East Coast supplier, with whom Raytheon felt it had a strong
working relationship.
This chapter focuses on the implementation challenges of the initial circulator substrate
offload.
Because of the intense time pressure created by the fire, Raytheon required a supplier that
would require little support to become operational. Based on this requirement, Raytheon
chose to go with an East Coastsupplier that had been used on a previous circulator
product.
The ramping up of production at the circulator substrate supplier on the East Coast
differed from Raytheon's usual process in a couple of critical ways. Firstly, the time
frame was accelerated. It can take months to choose a supplier for a major off-load and it
typically requires various formalized process steps and check points. The East Coast
supplier was chosen based on prior experience and preliminary technical benchmarking,
but the choice was made less than a week after the fire. Also, Raytheon shared more
information, materials and even in some cases equipment than is typical for an
outsourcing relationship.
Understanding the Risks
As a result of the fire, Raytheon needed to outsource its immediate substrate needs and
adapt its design process to work with an external rather than internal provider. The
supplier base for advanced substrates is very limited. It consists of one large supplier,
which supplies a broad spectrum of aerospace parts, and a number of fragmented smaller
players specializing in a specific technology. Raytheon always planned on outsourcing
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some of its substrate production to accommodate increasing volumes, but wanted to
maintain control over proprietary and developing technologies. Prior to the fire,
Raytheon had begun benchmarking suppliers in the field. The fire accelerated this
process and eliminated Raytheon's ability to discriminate what it wanted to outsource by
product type. It also required that the supplier(s) chosen needed to be up and running
almost immediately.
Proximity Risks
Proximity across the supply chain can be measured across four dimensions: geographic,
organizational, cultural and electronic (Fine, 1998, p. 136). Prior to the fire, Raytheon's
design team was in close proximity across each of these dimensions. The design
engineers, substrate production and circulator production were all housed under the same
roof in the same organization and utilized the same electronic data tools. Following the
fire, Raytheon's design engineering, substrate and circulator units were forced from being
geographically close (co-located) to being on opposite coasts.
The importance of being close on at least some of these dimensions is increased the more
integral the design and the less easily parts can be swapped out and substituted.
Substrates are the heart of the circulator design and the level where the majority of
product innovation takes place. While Raytheon outsourced the production of the
substrates, the design responsibility remained in-house. Post-fire, Raytheon needed to
develop a process for sharing design files, prototyping and validating results with an
external supplier. Raytheon also needed a method for remotely communicating demand
needs and potentially shifting priorities.
Product and Technology Risks
In order for the supplier to begin production there was a significant amount of technical
knowledge that needed to be shared. Previously, Raytheon's design team and production
team were housed at the same facility within the same organization. The fire forced the
separation of design and manufacturing. In order to transfer the required knowledge,
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Raytheon's key technical personnel went to the East Coast to facilitate the transition of
production.
In addition to sharing personnel and their knowledge, Raytheon also shared its
engineering drawings and production tools and materials not destroyed in the fire.
Although this made sense in the immediate aftermath of the fire, if the outsourcing
relationship was to continue long term, Raytheon would prefer to transfer some of these
functions over to the supplier.
Dependency Risks
Outsourcing increases dependency on the supplier, particularly when dealing with a non-
standard product like circulator substrates. Raytheon's risk was exacerbated by the fire.
In a few hours, Raytheon went from being able to supply itself to having no choice other
than to outsource. Obviously, this sudden change shifted the balance of power towards
the supplier during the accelerated supplier selection immediately following the fire. The
fact that Raytheon is a huge player in the aerospace industry mitigated this risk
somewhat. Raytheon outsourced circulator substrates to a small subsidiary of a medium
sized micro-electronics company. Raytheon's circulator substrate business made up a
meaningful percentage of the substrate subsidiary's revenue.
Although its large relative size gave Raytheon some leverage during the initial
negotiations, working with a small supplier has its own risks. The East Coast subsidiary,
which focused only on substrates, had roughly $11 million in annual revenues. When its
larger parent decided to divest the business, it was bought by a major aerospace supplier
looking to expand its substrate business. The East Coast facility where Raytheon
personnel had spent so much time transferring technical knowledge and completing first
articles would be closed and incorporated in to the purchasers much larger facility in
Rhode Island. Raytheon had chosen the East Coast supplier specifically for its unique
technical capability and personal service. That specialized capability, which is dependent
on human technical knowledge as well as equipment, is put at risk with a factory shut
down and relocation.
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Mitigating the Risks
There are several strategies that Raytheon can take in order to mitigate the risk of
outsourcing its circulator substrates. However, there is no way to prepare for every
possible permutation of events. The outsourcing of a product decreases your direct
control and increases your exposure to certain risks. The buyout of the circulator
substrate supplier is a good example of how outsourcing can expose you to new and
unexpected risks.
Partnership versus Arms Length Transaction
The initial relationship between Raytheon and the East Coast supplier was more of a
partnership than an arms length transaction. This strategy was used to increase proximity
across a number of dimensions, including electronic, geographical and cultural.
Raytheon dispatched several engineers, product line managers and supply chain
professionals to the East Coast supplier in order to assess the amount of technical
knowledge required to begin production and establish a workable production schedule.
This week long session was the first of many visits to the East Coast site during the initial
stages of the substrate offload. These visits helped to close the geographical proximity
gap.
During the initial East Coast site visit, a communication process was established. To give
Raytheon and the supplier a common reference for sharing and verifying information, a
spreadsheet cataloguing each product type, required materials, technical specifications
and desired quantities was created. A single point of contact was established at each
company to further facilitate the flow of information and the spreadsheet was maintained
solely by the supplier point of contact to ensure data integrity. Following the initial visit,
weekly conference calls were held to go over any outstanding issues.
Finally, Raytheon worked with the supplier to develop a process for prototyping and
design work. Because the type of work required is not known in advance, the supplier
created a general menu, which accommodated a variety of material types and processing
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steps. In this way, Raytheon had a general price guide to work from prior to knowing all
the details about a specific project. The supplier committed to a five day turnaround for
prototypes. Although this is significantly longer than one day required when the
substrate capability was internal it was much quicker than the typical lead time for a new
substrate order.
Decreasing Dependency
One strategy for decreasing dependency on an external supplier is to develop the
capability internally. Prior to the fire, Raytheon was independent for capability, but
expected to become dependent for capacity as volumes increased. After the fire,
Raytheon became dependent for capability. Raytheon still maintained the technical
knowledge through its engineering personnel and technicians, but that knowledge was no
longer housed in a facility with the required equipment.
Although dependence for capability is acceptable for some products, the supplier base for
circulator substrates is very limited, increasing the risk of market failure. Circulator
substrates are a customized product and require high asset specificity. Also, most of the
innovation that takes place in circulator based antenna systems happens at the substrate
level. Design and engineering will continue to be housed within Raytheon, but Raytheon
decreases its innovation capability by outsourcing substrate production and prototyping.
Conclusion
If Raytheon decides against outsourcing, it has several options for developing the
capability internally, including:
- Rebuilding the capability at the El Segundo site
- Expanding the capability at the Texas site
- Creating the capability at another alternate site
Each of these options offers different costs and benefits. Rebuilding in El Segundo
returns the proximity advantage for the circulator area by housing engineering,
production and downstream assembly in the same facility. Expanding the capability at
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the Texas site requires less capital investment and mitigates many of the risks associated
with using an external supplier. Creating the capability at another internal site makes the
least sense as it requires a large capital investment and does not provide the proximity
advantage of rebuilding in El Segundo.
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Chapter 9: Organizational Considerations
The ability of an organization to implement change is heavily influenced by
organizational factors. Unfortunately, organizational behavior is highly complex and
difficult to predict and control. In an effort to provide insight in to organizational
behavior, John Carroll proposes the Three Lenses model, which looks at an organization
from several angles. Each lens provides a different perspective on the underlying drivers
of behavior at the institutional and individual level.
The three lenses are the:
" Strategic Design Lens
" Political Lens
" Cultural Lens
Below, the Three Lenses model is applied to Raytheon's Solid State Microwave business
in order to better understand how the role of the organization in the ability to create and
sustain positive change (Carroll, 2001, p. 3).
Strategic Design Lens
The strategic lens views the organization as a highly rational system. The strategic lens
perspective assumes that a firm's strategy is crafted and carried out based on a rational
analysis of opportunities and capabilities. People who take the strategic view of an
organization focus on company structures like organizational groupings and hierarchy as
well as alignment mechanisms like bonuses, raises, stock options and promotions.
Strategic Groupings
Strategic groupings within an organization segregate clusters of tasks and activities.
Raytheon's Solid State Microwave business creates functional groupings such as
Engineering, Operations, Finance and Supply Chain. Each of these groups focuses on a
specific skill that supports Raytheon's Space and Airborne Systems overall goal of
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designing and manufacturing products to enhance space and airborne missions. By
dividing people in to groups focused on these tasks, Raytheon hopes to achieve
economies of scale and deepen the specialized knowledge within each of these areas. For
example, by grouping supply chain together, Raytheon can reduce the number of contact
points with key suppliers and consolidate demand across products.
Linking Mechanisms
Although grouping specialties together within an organization offers advantages, it also
creates the need to build bridges across specialized function. The overall goals of the
organization can not be reached without coordination between functional groups.
Various linking mechanisms are used to facilitate work between groups. These are
particularly important when addressing complex problems that span across the
organization. For example, the fire in Solid State Microwave's substrate area had
implications for many functions and product lines. In order to address the problems
stemming from the fire, Raytheon pulled together a cross-functional team with key
members from Finance, Supply Chain, Operations and Engineering. Each of these
functional areas had a key role to play in fire recovery.
In addition to sharing information across groups, linking mechanisms are important for
feeding information up and down the organizational hierarchy. Solid State Microwave's
Operations organization holds daily meetings to communicate what is happening on the
production floor to the management team. Information systems, like Materials Resource
Planning (MRP) software, act as a linking mechanism by sharing information that is used
across functional groups. One of the roles within a functional area might be to facilitate
information flow across groups, as is the case with Finance and Project Managers. In
addition to the formal linking mechanisms discussed above, informal routines develop,
such as carpools and lunches, which further disseminate information across groups.
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Alignment Mechanisms
Alignment mechanisms are used to ensure that the efforts of diverse functional groups
and the individuals that make up these groups are synchronized with the overall
organizational strategy. By tying incentives to metrics that require input from more than
one functional area, the goals of seemingly separate groups can be aligned. However,
identifying appropriate metrics and tracking them over time is not a simple task.
Issues in aligning incentives can be seen in the magnet assembly process. Operations
incentives are typically linked to lower costs and predictability. Design Engineers are
rewarded for innovative products. Innovation and lower costs are achieved through very
different means. Because the magnet assembly process fills both the production needs
managed by the Operations organization and the design and prototyping needs of the
Design Engineers there is significant potential for conflict. Design Engineers want to
design a flexible process that allows for experimentation. Operations managers want a
standardized process that allows for predictability and potentially lower costs.
Raytheon invests heavily in its Six Sigma program to provide incentives for continuous
improvement. Raytheon employs its own version of the Six Sigma approach, based on
benchmarking with Allied Signal and General Electric. The Raytheon Six Sigma
framework provides a common language to discuss and attack problems and is supported
by a network of trained Six Sigma experts. Raytheon has worked hard to disperse Six
Sigma process knowledge through all ranks and businesses. At the time of the internship,
100% of salaried and more than 50% of bargaining unit employees in SSM had been
certified as specialists, the first step to becoming an expert. In order to further motivate
employees, Raytheon offered gift certificates at various retailers for employees that
completed the first round of training.
Political Lens
The political lens views the organization as a struggle for power among stakeholders with
different goals and underlying interests. Power within an organization can come from a
variety of sources including formal management authority, unique knowledge or skills, or
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expertise and relationships that are generated over a long career in the same industry or
company.
Following the fire there were many discussions within Raytheon about whether or not to
rebuild the substrate production capability at the El Segundo site. There were several
different positions within the company, many motivated by how rebuilding the site might
shift power around the organization.
Former employees of the substrate area, including technical personnel and operators,
were interested in seeing the substrate capability rebuilt in El Segundo. Prior to the fire,
the responsibilities of this group revolved around producing substrates. In the immediate
aftermath of the fire, the day to day work of the technical personnel shifted from
producing substrates to getting suppliers established and determining the cost and
timeline of a potential rebuild. The nature of these new responsibilities was short term.
If a decision was made not to rebuild, the roles of these employees would be uncertain.
Many would likely be redeployed in new functions or products. Change is almost always
a threat to those who were valued and successful in the old system. A decision to rebuild
would reestablish the need for the pre-fire technical and operations roles.
The design engineers would also benefit from a reestablishment of the El Segundo site.
Having the substrate fabrication capability collocated with the design engineers allowed
for quick turnarounds and frequent communication. By shifting to an external supplier,
design engineers would have a minimum five day turnaround on prototypes and
decreased access to the people building their designs.
On the other hand, management at the Texas site was in favor of expanding the capability
of their substrate fabrication to include the former capabilities of the El Segundo site.
Increasing the volume and capability at the Texas site would increase its relative power
within the organization. The new technical knowledge Texas would obtain from
manufacturing the circulator substrates could also potentially open the door for future
business.
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Cultural Lens
The cultural lens addresses the meanings that people within an organization assign to
situations. Based on past history, analogies, metaphors and observations, people assign
unspoken meanings to the world around them.
Solid State Microwave (SSM) was originally part of Hughes Aircraft and much of its
culture can be traced back to these roots. Hughes, like Raytheon, places significant value
on technological innovation. Raytheon has a long history of innovation, including the
invention of the microwave and important contributions to the Mars Rover project.
Because of the value put on technical advances, the design engineer and other technical
professionals have a highly respected place in the organization.
Magnet sub-assemblies are not viewed as an innovative even though they are a
component of the technically complex and innovative active array systems. Because they
are a simple, low cost component, magnets do not receive a tremendous amount of
attention. Magnet assembly was sometimes overlooked by operations managers and it
was often difficult to get operations managers energized to attack problems in the
process.
Putting the Lenses Together
The three lenses are not meant to work directly together, but rather to provide a
framework for looking at an organization from multiple perspectives. No single view of
an organization can capture all of the complexity and multiple forces working to
influence decision making and behavior. Even combining the strategic, political and
cultural views does not give a complete understanding of the way an organization
functions.
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